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Abstract
The economy often moves in large jumps. For example, bank runs can quickly
cause an economy to suddenly drop into a deep recession. In this paper, bank
approval of loans to a genius entrepreneur may cause an economy to jump to
a higher income level or growth rate. In a simple model, this implies that the
economy has the possibility to exist in discrete states, a ground state (lowest
production level) or an excited state (higher production levels). In a more
dynamic model, bank approval of the loan causes an apparent technology
shock that temporarily increases economic growth. In this paper, the economy
is modeled as a regime switching model, i.e. a Markov-Switching model.
Keywords: Macroeconomics, Banking, Multiple Equilibria, Behavioral Economics,
Switching-Models.
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1 Introduction
How inventions have increased wealth, quality of life and life expectancy in the
modern world inspired me to write this paper. Not only has technology increased
longevity, but also how many people the world can support. In the modern world,
in order for many inventions to increase wealth and quality of life, it must be
massed produced. Mass production of new goods require investment, often funded
through loans from banks. However, not all good ideas are recognized by bankers.
Thus, whether an invention is ever brought to fruition often depends on the whims
of a banker, much in the same way an idea for a novel depends on the whims of
publishers. In this case, one fickle decision can determine whether an economic
boom occurs or not. An outside observer might conclude that there were two
possible equilibrium paths that the economy could have followed.
The financial collapse and subsequent great recession is another inspiration
for writing this paper. In September of 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers
caused a run on investment banks. In the next following months, much of the
western world would plunge into the deepest economic downturn since the Great
Depression. Many financial analysts blame the Federal Reserve and the United
States government for letting Lehman Brother’s collapse. Thus, one fickle decision
by U.S. officials may have caused a financial panic and deep recession. From an
outside observer, such decision appears random and arbitrary. He or she could
reason that a decision to bail out Lehman Brother’s could have prevented a financial
panic and kept the ongoing recession mild. Once again, the outsider observer might
conclude that there were two possible equilibrium paths the economy could have
followed.
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Multiple equilibria models have been used to describe why the economy can
boom then suddenly collapse. In Diamond and Dybvid (1983) bank runs can occur
when savers believe that the probability of a bank run is high. Thus, beliefs are
self-fulfilling. Masson (1999), analyzing the phenomenon of contagion, believe
that it may be useful to formulate models that do not have a unique equilibrium.
Gartner and Griesbach (2012) find strong evidence of multiple equilibria and self-
fulfilling prophecy in the market for sovereign bonds. Cooper and John (1988)
constructed an economic game theory model with multiple equilibria. In their
paper; cooperation increases economic output if there are spillover effects and
strategic complementarities.
The title of this paper makes reference to the word quantum. The word quantum
means a fixed discrete amount. This does not necessarily imply multiple equilibria.
Rather it could mean that a unique equilibrium can only occur at fixed discrete
points in a function. However, without continuity, there maybe no existence of an
equilibrium. We will see that in the model described in the next section, multiple
equilibria exist only if preferences are random. If preferences can be pinned down,
then the model has a unique solution, but the equilibrium point can only occur
at fixed discrete points. Nevertheless, in the real world, often times bankers and
government officials really do decide whether to go under a big project with large
economic implications or not.
The idea of multiple equilibria in economic models is unsettling to many
economists. For example, Morris and Shin (2000) criticize models with multiple
equilibria because they are a result of indeterminate beliefs. A shift in beliefs that
causes a change from one equilibrium to another is left unexplained. Moreover,
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without uniqueness of an equilibrium it is difficult to perform comparative-statics
analysis.
My response to the criticism is that in the real world, from an outside observer’
perspective, beliefs really could be indeterminate. A small change in circumstances
could have caused then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke to change his
mind of not to bailout Lehman Brothers. Nevertheless, it may be possible to assess
the probability of which equilibrium will prevail, in a sense converting the multiple
equilibrium model into a single equilibrium model. Nevertheless, if we could have
read Ben Bernanke’s mind, then beliefs are not indeterminate. However, at best
we could only make an educated guess of what was on Bernanke’s mind. But this
could have been done with a rational procedure, where an economist attempting
to make economic forecasts could have estimated the probability that Bernanke
would have changed his mind not to bailout Lehman Brothers. Thus, converting
the multiple equilibria problem into an unique equilibrium problem.
In this paper, economies can exist in the ground (low production) state or an
excited (higher production) state. In fact, for most of human history the economy
did indeed exist in or near the ground state. For thousands of years, humans had no
banking system, and thus, large projects that could accelerate economic growth did
not exist. In many ways, depressions caused by great financial collapses such as
the Great Depression is like the economy collapsing from a higher to lower state.
In the following model, approval of loans for one large project by a bank can cause
an economy to make a discrete jump from the ground state to an excited state.
One objection to this approach would be that in a large economy one large
project only increases economic wealth by an imperceptible amount. I disagree,
a president’s preference for a large public works project or for austerity can steer
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the economy into two different paths. Nevertheless, discrete jumps in wealth can
occur if bank acts are synchronized with the acts of other banks. Therefore, a
macroeconomic event shared by all banks, can cause them to take the same action
at the same time. If all banks increase their lending activity at the same time, the
macroeconomic economy can take a discrete jump to a higher state. Likewise, a
bad economic event shared by all banks can cause the economy to make a discrete
fall into a lower state, like dropping a coin into a well.
Thus, in this paper, the equilibrium state of a small town economy depends on
whether the bank approves a loan for a large proposed project that will increase
production of the economy. But a unique solution is possible if we can characterize
what determines the probability that the bank will approve or disapprove the loan.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I describe a two period
model. In section 3, I characterize the equilibrium and extend the model to infinite
periods, then draw up conclusions in section 4.
2 The Model Setup
2.1 The Village
The economy is set a long time ago in an isolated small town near the sea. The
world exists for two periods and then is swallowed up by the sun when it becomes
a red giant. The inhabitants use to be wandering hunter-gatherers, but because of
the abundant fish in the sea and fruit growing in a nearby forest, they have decided
that they can settle down and establish a small fishing village.
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In the beginning of the town, people lived by collecting their own food on
the beaches and in the forests. But there has been gossip that certain people have
dreams to invent new ways of catching fish, growing food and hunting game.
But these new projects cannot be undertaken unless these entrepreneurs can be
promised the necessities of life while they build up their manufacturing enterprises
and business. These rumors lead to at least one member of the village to start a
bank. In the first period of the town, entrepreneurs must decide if they really want
to undergo their projects and actually seek a loan from the banker. The banker
must be able to collect funds to lend, and then decide which projects to fund. The
banker basis his decision whether to fund the project or not on factors such as
general businesses conditions, and whether the entrepreneur has good prospects of
paying back the loan.
The village is called Little Town. Little Town has just been established and
all of its inhabitants collect their own food to eat. The world lasts for two periods
and then is swallowed up by the sun when it becomes a red giant. In period 1,
Ben is a banker who dreams that people will create technologies that will allow
people to consume more than their basic needs. He will have to take a survey to
see if there is enough food for everyone such that there will be people who will
put money in the bank. Likewise, some people aspire to be entrepreneurs that will
create more wealth, but more importantly, fulfill some of their dreams of building
a better world.
The condition that people must consume a minimum quantity of goods to
survive is also called the minimum expenditures requirement. This minimum
expenditures requirement maybe a reason why it takes a long time for poor societies
to experience economic growth. For example, Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1997)
6
concluded that because of the minimum expenditures requirement, poorer countries,
must spend resources to satisfy there basic needs. Therefore, they have less
resources and money left over for other types of spending such as investment
spending. This causes poorer countries to experience lower growth rates.
Little known to Ben, the technology genius is a rare person. If Ben can imagine
a world filled with little villages, like his own Little Town, he would observe
that a technology genius is born somewhere in the world only once every few
years. Furthermore, a technology genius that is willing to become an entrepreneur
and sell his or her invention comes along only once a generation. If the loan for
producing and marketing the invention is approved, the local economy will boom.
However, bankers have difficulty recognizing such an invention. Most inventions
do not increase overall economic productivity by that much. The question is
whether bankers like Ben recognize when a science genius’s invention is a positive
technology shock that economists such as Kydland and Prescott (1982) have
speculated about.
But Little Town does not exist in a New Classical world. Rather, not only does
Ben wish to maximize his bank’s profits, but fulfill his dreams. His dreams can
lead to a socially undesirable result since his dreams may not match the dreams of
society as a whole, or society may be dream neutral.
There has been arguments in the economics literature in favor of bounded
rationality. Oechssler et al. (2008) finds evidence that people with low cognitive
abilities tend to display more judgment bias than high cognitive people. Thus,
education can reduce judgment bias in society. Stanovich (2013) finds evidence that
irrationality often arises because individuals desire more than just satisfying first
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order desires. Finally, Barberis and Thaler (2003) argue that arbitrage not always
drives an economy to efficiency, and that bounded rationality can be modeled.
2.2 Period 1
Sharon is a fairly unique person in Little Town, and is that special inventor. Unlike
most people, she has a dream of not spending her life collecting food on the
seashore or in the forest. She has a dream of creating new farm technologies,
K (capital). If her dream is fulfilled, food production will become so great that
people will have enough time and food to spend on consumption other than those
that fulfill their basic needs. Right now, her budget constraint is that she either
consumes, saves or invests what she earns in income:
A1 f (N1) = Y 1 =C1+S1+K1 (1)
where A is a productivity parameter, in this model associated with the quality of
the climate, f is the production function, N is hours spent on the beach collecting
food, Y is income, C is consumption, S is savings and superscript 1 denotes the
first period. Note that the fruits of capital are not obtained until the second period.
Sharon also faces a minimum consumption requirement in every period of:
Ct ≥Cts (2)
where superscript t denotes period t. If the minimum requirement is not fulfilled,
Sharon dies and does not survive the existing period.
Sharon also maximizes her discounted utility, which depends on her hours
worked and the amount of goods she consumes in each period. However, for the
purpose of this paper, I choose not to tell this part of the story. I well tell you that as
8
a result of her utility maximization she will choose a combination of hours worked,
and her total consumption for each period. I am only interested in the case where
she will ask for a loan, described below.
Sharon has an alternate choice to labor. She can choose to become an en-
trepreneur and build a farm, but in order to do that she must obtain enough loans
to satisfy her minimum consumption requirement in period 1 and a minimum
requirement of funds to complete her project. Sharon must obtain loans because if
she undertakes her project, she must devote all of her energies into building her
farm. Because of this reality, if she chooses to become an entrepreneur she earns
no income in period 1 or:
A1 f (N1) = 0 (3)
Let K1m denote the minimum expenditures or capital K
1 required to finish a product,
which is usually relatively large when compared to personal income Y. Equation
(2) implies that in order for Sharon to become an entrepreneur Ben must agree to
give her at least enough loans D to satisfy the requirement:
D1 ≥C1s +K1m (4)
If Ben loans the minimum amount of funds to just barely satisfy Sharon’s mini-
mum requirement to become an entrepreneur, Sharon will have zero savings. She
could have positive savings if Ben loans her more then the minimum requirement.
Sharon will first determine if both alternatives satisfy her survivability require-
ments. If both alternatives do, she then compares which alternative maximizes her
expected utility.
Ordinarily, in an economy where a banker has monopolistic powers, the banker
can choose his or her own interest rates. However, I will assume that Ben is
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bounded by the elder council in the community that has imposed usury laws
allowing the council to fix the interest rate. The interest rate is fixed below the
monopolist’s optimum price, but above the competitive equilibrium price. I make
this assumption merely to simplify the analysis and argue that the ability to fix
interests rates is not a necessary component of my story.
Ben earns profits by using bank deposits to fund projects proposed by en-
trepreneurs or large investors. The amount of bank deposits used to fund projects
is denoted as B. In order to earn a profit, Ben must charge large investors a higher
interest rate than the rate of interest he must pay his depositors. Furthermore, bank
revenues f (B) in nonlinear because revenues also depend on how many investors
default on their loans. The usual assumption is that the following conditions hold:
f1(B)> 0 (5)
and
f11(B)< 0 (6)
where f1 denotes the partial derivative with respect to B, and f11 represents the sec-
ond partial derivative with respect to B. Equation (5) states that revenue increases
with B and equation (6) assumes that the revenue function f is concave. These
assumptions ensure that the maximization problem will have a unique solution
under the assumption of continuity.
In a New Classical world, the Ben’s objective is to maximize the bank’s profits
Π by choosing a level of assets it invests in projects. The amount of deposits
not chosen for investment will be kept in vaults for safekeeping denoted as U .
Therefore, total deposits are given by the equation:
D = B+U (7)
10
Even if the money is not used for further investments, the bank is still important
because it can keep the money safe from thieves, something that the average
depositor might not be capable of doing. Let B represent bank deposits that are
invested, rB the interest rate the banker pays the depositor and L represent assets
from a large investor, and rL the interest rate it charges to fund the projects of large
investors. Ben’s objective can be stated as choosing B = B∗ such that:
Max Π(B) = Max [rL f (B)− rB(B+U)] (8)
But Ben cannot collect more assets than the aggregate amount of possible
surplus consumption ∑Cs. The possible surplus consumption is the amount of
consumption over the minimum consumption requirement needed to survive. We
will assume he cannot invest more than the total amount of deposits ∑D in his
bank, which is also less than total surplus consumption in Small Town since not all
surplus consumption is deposited in the bank. Thus, Ben faces a constraint of:
B≤∑D≤∑Cs (9)
If ∑D is positive then the first order condition is:
f1(B) = rB/rL (10)
The optimal solution is to choose the amount of assets to be invested in big
projects B∗ where the marginal product of the assets is equal to its marginal cost.
If ∑Cs is not positive, then Ben will not form the bank. In fact, we can extend the
model to include expectations. In a model with expectations, Ben will not form the
bank unless the expected bank profits exceed what he can earn collecting food on
his own.
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In assessing whether to fund an individual project or not, the profit function
Π will depend on the credit worthiness of the entrepreneur and project. Credit
worthiness will depend on state of the climate A1. Thus, the profit function may
be written as Π(A,B); however, A is not a choice variable. But the value of A
could have large implications since a very low A could make all projects not credit
worthy.
As mentioned above not only does Ben wish to maximize his bank’s profits,
but he also wants to maximize his dreams represented by his dream function ψ .
Let d represent a scale Ben’s desires and is positive for projects with subjective
good characteristics and negative for projects with subjective bad characteristics;
then Ben’s problem is to maximize his dream function mathematically written as.
Max ψ[(d,Π(B)] (11)
We assume that Ben’s dreams are more fulfilled the greater d is or:
ψ1 > 0 (12)
where subscript 1 represents the partial derivative of the dream function with
respect to the desirability scale d.
We also assume that Ben’s dreams are more fulfilled the greater the bank’s
profits are:
ψ2 > 0 (13)
where subscript 2 represents the partial derivative of the dream function with
respect to profits.
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Ben’s desires can be just about anything. He may desire that Small Town
become a farming community, or a village that builds great statues for travelers to
see. But for now, d represents a range a characteristics a proposed project might
have. In this example, I assume that Ben can rate each project’s desirability as a
number.
For simplicity, let us assume that the dream function is linear and can be written
in the form of:
ψ[d,Π(B)] = [rL f (B)− rB(B+U)+Φ(d)] (14)
where Φ is a concave function that increases with d. Maximizing the dream
function in (14) by choosing a B∗ and d∗ yields the first order condition
f1(B)+Φ(d) = rB/rL (15)
Therefore, the banker will not do optimal investing, if society is dream neutral.
Projects with undesirable characteristics will receive below socially optimal fund-
ing, and projects with desirable characteristics will receive above socially optimal
funding. Sometimes, macroeconomic conditions may make most projects either
desirable or undesirable. If most projects become desirable, then a speculative
bubble occurs. If most projects become undesirable, an economic crash occurs. In
balance sheet recessions, see Koo (2009), high debt may increase the odds that a
bank will go bankrupt. Therefore, high debt will cause banks to underfund projects
if high debt is regarded by Ben as an undesirable characteristic.
Notice, that the model has a unique equilibria. The equilibrium will either occur
if the loan is granted or if the loan is rejected. If Ben’s preference were somewhat
random, that is his preferences depended on random shocks, this indeterminacy
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would mean that the model has multiple equilibria. The outside observer would
solve the problem by calculating the probability that Ben looks at farming in a
positive light.
2.3 Period 2
In an economy with just Sharon as an investor, two possible outcomes are possible.
If Ben decided not to give Sharon the minimum required loans, then Sharon lives
her life as a collector of food in the forest and seashore. Her second period budget
constraint becomes:
A2 f (N2) = Y 2 =C2− (1+ rB)S1 (16)
Because the world is now going to be destroyed by the sun at the end of this
period, there is no investment and savings in period 2. Rather, Sharon will consume
all of her income she earns in period 2 and whatever she saved in period 1 plus the
interest she earned by depositing her savings in Ben’s bank.
But there is a second possibility where she was able to receive a loan and invest
in capital equipment and extra labor. Sharon added many workers, and together
they were able to produce more income than what every one could have produced
separately. Thus Sharon’s budget constraint in period 2 was:
A2 f (N2,K1) = Y 2 =C2− (1+ rB)S1+(1+ rL)D1 (17)
Although Sharon must now pay back the loans she obtained from Ben in period
1 plus the interest on the loan, her income was much higher than what she would
have been had she just been a collector of food on the seashore and in the forest.
However, there was a chance that her project would fail. In this case, her second
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period income was low, and she could not pay back the loans. That is why Ben
might have denied her the loans in the first place. Nevertheless, most likely the
loan would have brought the economy to an excited state.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Ground and Excited States
In the above example, there was only one entrepreneur. The fate of this entrepreneur
made a large impact of the fate of the Little Town economy. Because the large
proposed project was a take it or leave it deal, the economy was either going to
settle on the excited state or ground state. Let Y2 equal aggregate income in period
2, Y1 period 1 aggregate income, the solution of the model takes the form of:
Y2 = αS+βY1+ ε (18)
where S a random variable that equals zero or one and its value does not depend on
the initial state of period 1, α a constant, β ≤ 1 a constant assumed to be close to
one, and ε an error term with mean zero and variance σ2ε .
The random variable S determines whether the economy will be in the ground
state or excited state. If S = 0, the economy is in the ground state, else if S = 1
the economy will be in the excited state. However, in order to find the solution, a
probabilistic model of which state the economy will be in must be constructed.
The characteristics of this solution occur because the project is considered to be
indivisible. In most macroeconomic models, all variables are usually assumed to
be divisible. This means that a variable can take on any arbitrary number, whether
it is a whole number or fraction. This assumption is unrealistic for it means that
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Figure 1: A ball represents the position of the economy. Because Ben gave Sharon a loan, the ball
moved up to an excited state. Because Sharon’s project was for all practical purposes a take it or
leave deal, the local or neighborhood small economy was going to either going to settle on the
ground state or excited state. This quantum story is less convincing for a large economy. However,
if banks experience the same macroeconomic shocks, the economy could theoretically experience
only a few discrete possible long run economic growth rates, rather than a continuum of growth
rates.
people could live in an arbitrary small house. Most likely, a person can only live in
a house with a minimum required size. Certainly, a house must be at least as large
as the person residing in the house.
The invisibility of goods and capital goods is common in economics, especially
for expensive goods such as health care insurance. For any given person, he or
she has a discrete number health care plans to choose from. The cheapest plan
cannot have a value or price arbitrary close to zero. Rather, there is a minimum
premium each person must pay for insurance. This model could be relevant for
macroeconomic models where big projects or policy changes are either approved
by congress or not. For example, either a major public works project is approved
by congress/parliament or not.
This economic story in this paper is very simple. An extension of this model
could be to add an additional period. In period 2, banks could use the deposits
they collected and invest them in the stock market or buy subprime mortgages.
As we mentioned, if a common macroeconomic event occurs that causes certain
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project characteristics to be more desirable, then a speculative bubble could result.
Once the bubble bursts, banks will fail and bank runs can occur. A bank run could
occur if savings in banks depend on the perceived probability that the bank will
fail. If bank failure is perceived to be likely, a large number of people will pull out
their savings from banks. The above extension can then be modified to include an
infinite number of periods, which we will investigate in section 3.3.
3.2 Which State?
One problem with this simple model is that it is filled with discontinuities. If we
assume the case where Ben’s dream function is indeterminate, discontinuities are
eliminated by using probability density functions which transforms the problem
into one of probability. Thus, we do not solve which state the ball is in, but rather
the probability that the ball is in a certain state. Therefore, the proper way to model
the above story is to transform it into one of probability where the solution will be
in terms of the probability that the economy will be in the ground state or in the
excited state.
The model predicts that the set of possible equilibrium solutions is discrete and
not continuous. By changing the model to one that is statistical in nature, the set of
possible equilibrium solutions becomes continuous. Lets modify the model and
suppose the solution as an extra equilibrium, say one ground state and two excited
states. The economy can exist out of equilibrium when a shock occurs that pushes
the economy from one state to another. What we can do is postulate a probability
density function, which will describe the relatively likelihood that the economy
will exist at a given GDP level as depicted in Figure 2. In this model, to make a
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solution attainable, we assume that the equilibrium states are shaped like small
boxes with a height of l.
We may interpret the below illustration as three equilibrium states of the
economy, or where S can be equal to three discrete values. The ground state occurs
when there is no banking system or a depressed banking system that has suffered
massive bank runs. The middle state is located where the economy experiences
normal growth, while the upper excited state occurs when the economy experiences
high wealth and high growth because Ben approved the loan. The curves represent
probability density function denoted as Ψ2(x) where x represents GDP output. I
assume that GDP must always be greater or equal to zero.
Let A be the point corresponding to the bottom of the middle box and B the top
of the box, where A+B = l. The probability pi that the economy will reside in the
lower excited state is expressed as the definite integral:
pi =
∫ B
A
Ψ2(x)dx (19)
Because probabilities must be between zero and one, we have the requirement:
∫ ∞
0
Ψ2(x)dx = 1 (20)
When equation (19) satisfies equation (20), Ψ is said to be normalized.
The function Ψ is complex, and depends on how each stable region is character-
ized and the adjustment process from one stable region to another stable region. In
a multiple equilibrium model under the assumption of efficient markets, the stable
regions would be the only possible equilibrium intervals.
An analogy to the illustration in Figure 2 is to think of the white ball as a ping
pong ball rolling along a narrow shelf. The rectangular boxes represent dents in the
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Figure 2: Three possible states depicted as triangular boxes with a height of l are depicted. The
bottom box represents the ground state and the two upper boxes are excited states. The curves
represent the probability density function of where the economy (the white ball) will reside. In
this illustration, the economy resides in the middle state or lower excited state. Because the boxes
represent stable equilibrium intervals, there is a greater probability that the economy will reside in
one of the boxes. In fact, in a perfect competitive economy, where markets adjust instantaneously,
the probability that the economy will reside outside of the boxes is zero. However, if adjustment
is slow, there will be a positive probability that the economy will reside outside of the boxes. In
models with multiple equilibria, the boxes can represent the possible multiple equilibrium boxes.
shelf with a length l and width equal to the width of the shelf. When the ball rolls
into the dent, it enters a region of stability. When the dent has infinite depth, we
say that the dent becomes a box. Thus, the rectangular boxes in the above figure
really are not boxes but rectangular shaped narrow dents on a shelf. In order for
the ball to roll to another stable dent, some force or in this case an economic shock
must hit the ball. The shock may be of any kind, including changes in government
policy. If the table is bounded with a wall so that the ball cannot roll off the table,
and there is no friction, the ball is unstable until it rolls into one of the three dents.
Certain dents may be deeper than other dents or the shelf may have a slope, making
one dent more likely to be the final resting point of the ball. Therefore, in a bank
run model, the economy may reside in an intermediate excited state or equilibrium
the majority of the time. Bank run equilibrium may occur, but will be less frequent.
Of course, characterizing the probability density function is problematic. The
only way to characterize such a function is for an economist to travel to many
villages and to observe the probabilities that such projects under certain economic
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conditions will be approved. Either that, the economist has to discover something
about the banker’s dreams. Thus, the form of the probability density function is
only discovered by empirical analysis.
3.3 Infinite Periods - Markov Switching Model
The model is now modified to include an infinite number of periods. In each period
a genius entrepreneur asks the bank for a loan. If the bank approves the loan,
the entrepreneur will build new technologies that increase output of the economy.
Many entrepreneurs ask the bank for loans, but the banker cannot ex ante identify
which entrepreneur is the genius. From an econometric point of view, output is
now a non-stationary process because technological changes permanently increases
it. Therefore, we would like to rewrite output in terms of income growth.
Moreover, at any given period t we now know what state the economy is in.
The question is whether the banker will approve the loan and cause the economy
to switch to a higher state, in this case, a higher growth rate state. Such models are
called Markov Switching Models and were initially analyzed by Lindgren (1978).
See also Hamilton (2008) for a simple explanation of switching models.
The solution of the model takes the form of:
γt = α0+α1st +β1γt−1+ εt (21)
where γt is the current economic growth rate, γt−1 is the economic growth rate
of the previous period, α0, α1, and β1 are constants, st = 0,1 are Markov state
variables, and εt are independent, identically distributively (i.i.d.) random variables
with mean zero and variance σ2ε . Notice that in order to sustain a higher growth
rate, the banker must throughout time approve loans to a genius entrepreneur.
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In other words, technical progress must be made in every period. If technology
progress is not made in a period, then economic growth will be lower in the next
period. However, economic output will still be higher because technical innovations
increases the level of economic output.
The Markov state variable st is a random variable that switches from zero to
one. When it is zero, the economy follows the lower state economic growth rate.
When st is one, the economic growth follows the higher state, the faster economic
growth rate. To complete the description of the model, requires a probabilistic
model of why st changes from zero to one. Many models are possible. But a
common specification is that st follows a Markov chain.
4 Conclusions
Economists has long theorized that technical progress is key to long term economic
growth. For example, Solow (1957) proposed that a technical change index A(t)
augments the production function. In this paper, production of a new type of
productive capital raises the economy from a lower to higher economic growth rate.
However, in order for this new technology to be produced, a banker must approve
a loan to the entrepreneur who proposes to produce the capital good. If the banker
approves the loan, then what could be regarded as a positive technology shock can
occur.
Although macroeconomists will be unsettled that random chance determines
which equilibrium the economy will follow, this model can explain why the econ-
omy can suddenly take off or stall. If bank lending drops suddenly, then the
economy can even collapse because of a financial panic. If the example is con-
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verted to a multiple equilibria model, unlike past multiple equilibria models, I have
made an attempt to characterize which equilibrium will be chosen. Intuitively,
one cannot say that financial panics and economic recessions of the past were
pre-determined. In the case of the financial crisis of 2008, one can see that initially
bankers were inspired to give out subprime mortgage loans at a rate greater than
the socially optimal rate. These subprime mortgages were toxic assets. When the
real estate market burst, projects became more undesirable such that loan standards
increased across the board. The standards became so stringent that banks have
been willing to sit on most of the cash they hold as deposits rather than give loans
to entrepreneurs. This has caused the economy to drop from one excited state to a
lower excited state. Should the banking industry completely collapse, the economy
could drop to the ground state.
In this paper, I do not attempt to explain negative technology shocks. Rather,
technical progress always increase income levels. However, failure to approve
loans can cause economic growth to slow. An extension of this model is to include
a financial panic state. In order to predict when big swings in the economy such as
a financial panic or bank run will occur, the big challenge is to model a probability
distribution of whether an event will occur. Because financial panics are rare events,
this will require data that possibly go back centuries.
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